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Introduction: The Resurgent Jury
When I first began to study the jury more than thirty years ago, the
topic of this Journal issue, jury systems around the world, was unthinkable.
The use of juries, especially in civil litigation, had long been in decline, to
the point of near extinction in England, the land of their birth, and the live
question was whether the jury system would endure in the United States.1
It seemed clear that juries would not continue in their classic form, as
many U.S. states, with the Supreme Court's eventual approval, mandated
juries of less than twelve people and allowed verdicts to be returned by
different supermajority votes. Although the federal government was precluded as a constitutional matter from reducing the size of its criminal
juries below twelve or allowing non-unanimous verdicts in criminal cases,
six-member juries were not only allowed in federal civil cases but became
the standard.
The thrust of reform thirty years ago aimed not at improving jury decision-making, but rather at reducing the jury's sway. Scholars and practicioners decried more than praised the jury trial requirements of the Sixth
and Seventh Amendments of the U.S. Consititution. The predominant view
t The Eric Stein Distinguished University Professor of Law and Sociology at the
University of Michigan.
1. Let me apologize to the reader used to law review writing for not following specific claims with the detailed documentation of which law reviews make a fetish. I
regard this brief piece as an informal essay, where such citation would be more affectation than necessity. Those aware of the jury literature will know that what I write is, if
not indisputably true, easily supportable by reference to the literature. Those unfamiliar
with the literature might find the presence of citations comforting, but I doubt if anyone,
except possibly the editors of this Journal, would go out and check them for accuracy.
For those interested in what decades of jury research have taught us, as well as studies
that support much of what I say here and below, I would recommend Valerie Hans and
Neil Vidmar's synthetic overview of jury research and the American jury trial system,
NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HAN's, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT (forthcoming 2007). See
generally Valerie P. Hans, Introduction: Citizens as Legal Decision Makers: An Interna-

tional Perspective, 40 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 2 (2007).
40 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 477 (2007)
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seemed to be that ordinary lay people could not be expected to decide
cases as wisely as the typical trial judge. The push to abolish jury trial in
complex civil cases appeared especially strong, and for a time it looked as
if the Supreme Court might well give trial judges authority to do just that,
or perhaps even mandate the abolition of jury trial in certain cases as a
requisite of due process.
American exceptionalism in the Use of the jury was itself a point
against the abolition of jury trials. 2 Commentators contrasted continental
bench trial and mixed court systems with the American system of lay fact
finding, arguing that the American system came off poorly by comparison.
They viewed the institution of jury trial as a prime source of unreasonable
delay in the American system of adversarial litigation, as well as a major
reason why criminal defendants forfeited their right to have their cases
heard by accepting plea bargains. Lay jurors, many argued, not only
understood the law poorly, but also were less able than experienced judges
to resolve difficult factual issues.
The American jury system did have its defenders, to be sure, and
research, beginning with the magisterial efforts of Kalven and Zeisel3 to
understand jury decision-making, indicated that juries evaluated evidence
rationally and had other important strengths. Still the idea that other
countries might want to adopt jury trial systems and assign cases heard by
judges or mixed tribunals to juries would have struck most American jury
researchers and commentators as fanciful, and would have puzzled even
foreign observers. Juries had no prominent advocates abroad, and domestically the issue seemed to be whether the American jury system, as traditionally constituted, would long endure.
Fast forward thirty or so years. A number of countries that thirty
years ago did not have jury systems have adopted them, or are in the process of adopting them. Other countries, even if not adopting full blown
jury trial systems, are altering their trial processes to secure citizen input.
The idea of a symposium on lay adjudication systems around the world is
no longer a far-fetched idea, as the reader of this Journal can testify, and
this is not the first publication to think the topic merited a symposium.
What has happened?
The story begins, I expect, in the United States where jury research
became something of a cottage industry. Careful research exploded myths
about jury biases and incompetence, questioning assumptions that judges
would decide cases differently or more competently than juries do. At the
same time this research identified difficulties juries confronted and suggested ways, such as allowing note taking and providing written instructions, to improve jury performance. In particular, those outside the
2. The jury, of course, is not unique to the United States. Great Britian, many
former British Colonies, and a few other countries have employed juries for particular
circumstances but the use of juries in these contries often was restricted considerably.
Scholars viewed the United States as the major country where the system of jury trial, in
civil as well as criminal cases, flourished.
3. See HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966).
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academic community who are the closest observers of juries-attorneys,
judges, news reporters, and citizens who have served on juries-regularly
gave juries and the experience of being a juror high marks. Except in a few
areas, such as punitive damages and tort litigation where well-financed
interest groups have kept up a drumbeat of attack on individuals who sue
and occasionally on juries that award them damages, the result has been
that the institution of jury trial seems well-supported in the United States
today. United States exceptionalism in the legal authority it accords ordinary citizens is no longer regarded as an anachronism that contrasts unfavorably with legal procedures in continental countries and elsewhere
around the globe.
At the same time that research blunted attacks on juries and engendered new respect for them in the United States, the U.S. rose to a position
of unparalleled power and prestige in the world system. The U.S. was winning the Cold War, and both economically and militarily other nations
came to acknowledge the United States as the world's only true superpower. United States culture was only slightly less hegemonic, as American television and music developed followings throughout the globe, while
English became the most commonly understood international language
and the world's language of choice for communication in the spheres of
science, education, and business. Especially important was the place the
United States occupied in post-secondary education before the 2001 attack
on the World Trade Center. Although comparative tests scores cast doubt
on the relative quality of primary and secondary education in the United
States, the United States' elite colleges and graduate schools were regarded
as without parallel in the world of higher education. As a result, bright
students from around the globe, including such erstwhile enemies as
China and Russia, flocked to the United States for their college and graduate education. Some studied law, and, when they returned to their home
countries, they brought with them models of legal procedure as practiced
in the United States, including the use of juries to resolve factual disputes.
Not all foreigners who studied law in the United States left enamored
of juries. It is probably safe to say that most did not pay much attention to
the American jury system, or, if they did, were not convinced it was superior to their home country's procedures. However, enough did so that in
some. countries, such as Japan, Korea, and Russia, there were at least small
numbers in the academy and elsewhere interested in the possibility of
incorporating lay voices into their legal fact finding systems. The American
model of citizen participation in trials became disseminated around the
globe, particularly in academic circles, with admiration it previously had
not enjoyed. Only favorable soil was necessary for the idea to grow.
I.

Democratic Institution or Institution of Democracy

That favorable soil existed. It was the spread of democracy to formerly
authoritarian or one-party dominant regimes. In the minds of some, juries
and democracies went together. While the example of Western Europe
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makes it clear that juries are not essential to democratic governance, they
are antithetical to rigid authoritarian rule. A government that seeks hegemonic domination must control the application of legal power, and dispersing the ultimate power to determine who has committed a crime or
suffered a compensable injury to a randomly selected group of citizens
undercuts the state's power. Thus, it is not surprising that movements
toward jury justice have occurred in countries such as Spain, Russia, South
Korea, and South Africa in the aftermath of authoritarian rule, and in
Japan when the long term one-party domination of the Liberal Democratic
Party began to diminish. Nor is it surprising that these movements largely
have been confined to the criminal jury, since politically motivated criminal punishment has long been a central instrument of authoritarian
control.
Thus, it is easy to celebrate the jury as a democratic institution, and
advocates for the jury in this country and abroad do just this. However, we
should be careful in what we celebrate. While the jury is supposed to be a
non-bureaucratic popular institution of self-government, in an important
sense it is not intended to be democratic. Rather it is supposed to accurately assess fault, no matter what public opinion is on a matter and no
matter what outcomes people prefer. This is an important distinction
because outcomes of democratic processes are not always benign. Democracy elevated Hamas from a terrorist organization to a partner, if not the
dominant force, in governing the Palestinian territories. The current leader
of Iran, who has denied the Halocaust and pushed for the development of
a nuclear state, was elected in a democratic election due to the popularity
of his populist policies. 4 Vladimir Putin, who appears hell-bent on strangling Russia's progress toward democracy, originally prevailed in a reasonably fair election, and he enjoys a level of popularity in public opinion
polls that suggest broad-based popular support for many of his authoritarian actions.
Closer to home, when we look at how popular sentiments have influenced our own jury justice, we see times and places where juries have frequently, if not routinely, acquitted drunk drivers, blamed women for
walking into situations where they were sexually assaulted, and, in the
South particularly, refused to convict whites who beat, raped, or killed
African Americans. Moreover, had the Supreme Court not intervened in
the case of New York Times v. Sullivan,5 juries might have destroyed the
institution of the free press by granting large awards to people who sued
6
unpopular publications for libel.
4. Certain candidates, who might have been formidable foes, were not allowed on
the ballot in Iran-hardly a perfect democratic regime. However, the United States poses
almost insurmountable barriers to the effective running of third party campaigns. So
while our situation is nothing like that in Iran, we too cannot boast of perfect democracy. Similarly Japan, regarded as a democracy since the United States' occupation
ended, was a country with one party rule for half a century.
5. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
6. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 3 (documenting that juries systematically
under-enforced crimes in the 1950s). There are fewer examples of Southern juries
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Rather than view juries as democratic institutions and glorify them for
this reason, I think juries are better viewed as institutions of democracy.
Juries neither create democracies nor are they essential to them, and we
seldom want their verdicts to reflect popular sentiments, but I believe that
only democracies can tolerate true jury justice. Jury systems, once in
place, support democratic forms of government, as they are uncongenial to
authoritarian rule. This is largely because juries are one-shot decisionmakers, concerned only with justice in a particular case. As such, juries
interpose a non-bureaucratic element, beyond the direct control of state
authorities, into criminal conviction processes. Even when most jurors
support a regime's policies, there are likely to be differences of opinion
among the jurors, and even regime supporters are likely to take seriously
their task assignment, which is to find facts in a particular case without
regard to political or other preferences. Jurors also work to shield judges
from politics because judges cannot be held responsible for jurors' decisions, and the presence of jury trial reduces incentives to buy or pressure
judges. Moreover, the experience of serving on a jury may itself bolster
civic democratic commitments.
Perhaps the best test of this thesis lies in changes made in trial
processes as a democracy expands or contracts. I already have alluded to
the resurgence of juries and of interest in the institution of jury trial in
countries that have moved from more authoritarian to more open and democratic regimes. An even more telling example is the fate of the Russian
jury that Stephan Thaman documents in this issue. 7 His tale is not one of
the jury's birth in conjunction with a resurgence of democracy. 8 Rather it
is a story of restrictions on jury power and finality of jury verdicts that has
been part and parcel of the Putin regime's efforts to return Russia to one
party and one-person rule.
II.

Internationalizing Jury Research

A major theme of the Citizen Participation in East Asian Legal Systems
Conference, where the papers in this volume were originally presented, was
the desirability of cross-national research on citizen involvement in legal
systems. Although my explicit focus to this point has been on juries, citizen involvement can take many forms. Indeed, in the broadest perspective,
meaningful citizen involvement in justice systems is almost inevitable
because citizens serve as witnesses, complainants, and police officers, and
it is hard to imagine systems in which these and similar citizen inputs did
not play important roles. However, our concern is with a narrower sphere
acquitting whites, who killed or raped blacks, simply because prosecutors seldom
brought these cases. Perhaps the most celebrated example, because it resulted in a trial,
of an acquittal and a later admission-to a journalist-of guilt, is the Emmett Till case.
See, e.g., STEPHENJ. WHITFIELD, A DEATH IN THE DELTA: THE STORY OF EMMETT TILL (1988).
7. See Stephen C. Thaman, The Nullification of the Russian Jury: Lessons for Jury
Inspired Reform in Eurasia and Beyond, 40 CORNELL INT'L LJ. [-_](2007).
8. See Stephen C. Thaman, The Resurrection of Trial by Jury in Russia, 31 STAN. J.
INT'L

L. 61 (1995).
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of citizen involvement, namely official citizen participation in judging the
legal implications of allegedly untoward behavior.
This participation may, of course, take many forms. Sanja Kutnjak
IvkoviCs symposium contribution reviews the literature on mixed tribunals
and the limited power that lay participants typically have within them, 9
while Hiroshi Fukurai describes Japan's reformed Prosecutorial Review
Commissions, which seem more jury-like than the mixed tribunals that,
beginning in 2009, will constitute the Saiban-in-Seido, or petit quasi-jury
system in Japan. 10 Moreover, as Frank Munger reminds us in his contribution to this issue,11 whether and how citizen involvement takes root in a
country is more than just a matter of how democratic the country is or
aspires to be. Rather, modes of citizen involvement are inextricably linked
to country cultures, and similar forms of participation may have different
symbolic meanings, depending on a country's history and understandings.
One reason the Russian jury has proven to be such a fragile institution of
democracy may be because there is a long tradition in Russia of trials
courts as instruments of centralized social control. Thus, the assertion of
central control to reverse jury verdicts may not seem nearly as odd or
threatening to Russians, including Russian proponents of political democracy, as similar attempts to reverse jury decisions would appear in the
United States.
The global spread of juries and related institutions has opened new
vistas for research, and there are scholars around the world who believe
that the time is ripe for coordinated cross-national research into institutions that involve ordinary citizens in legal decision-making. I share this
view and shall indicate below issues on which a research program might
focus. To ease my explication, I shall occasionally use the terms "jury" and
"jurors" expansively to refer not just to true jury systems, as they exist in
the United States and other countries, but also to the variety of institutional arrangements that give lay citizens input into case-based legal decision-making, including, most importantly, mixed tribunals of various
sorts.
The first task that any attempt at coordinated research on juries and
related institutions must accomplish is the identification of variables that
can be used to distinguish and evaluate different arrangements for giving
citizens input into legal decision-making. One set of variables that should
be evaluated on some common metric concerns the breadth and depth of
citizen involvement. We want to be able to answer on a comparative basis
such questions as: How many people serve on juries? How are jurors chosen? How many cases do the juries hear? What kinds of cases do jurors sit
9. See Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovit, Exploring Lay Participationin Legal Decision-Making:
Lessons from Mixed Tribunals, 40 CORNELL INT'I L.J. [__1(2007).
10. See Hiroshi Fukurai, The Rebirth of Japan's Petit Quasi-jury and Grand Jury Systems: Cross-NationalAnalysis of Legal Consciousness and Lay ParticipatoryExperience in
Japan and the U.S., 40 CORNELL INT'L L.J. [1-(2007).
11. See Frank Munger, ConstitutionalReform, Legal Consciousness, and Citizen participation in Thailand, 40 CORNELL INT'L L.J. [-1(2007).
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on? Do they sit only as lay decision-makers or are they members of mixed
tribunals? If citizens serve with professional judges, what is the ratio of lay
judges to professional judges and how are responsibilities divided among
them? What questions are given to jurors to answer, and what rules govern
their decisions? Under what circumstances may jury verdicts be overturned immediately or on appeal? For what reasons may verdicts be overturned, and what are the consequences of a verdict reversal? Are cases
retried to a different jury or can an appellate court enter the verdict it
prefers?
Answers to these and similar questions will allow the creation of a
taxonomy of lay adjudicator power in legal decision-making systems
around the world and an assessment of the likelihood that lay adjudication
will serve as a check on authoritarian exercises of power. The more insulated juror selection processes are from authority, the more independent
jurors are of judges, the broader the questions entrusted to jurors and the
more limited the grounds for overturning jury verdicts, the more power
jurors will have vis-a-vis other institutions of government. To some extent,
the answers to these questions will be conceptual and turn on the analysis
of official rules regulating lay participation. Detailed analysis of procedural rules often will reveal that power is allocated differently in what, on the
surface, seem to be similar systems. For example, in some but not all
mixed tribunals the presiding judge writes the official explanation of the
tribunal's verdict, which will be the basis for any appeal, even if the judge
disagrees with that verdict. This procedural rule enhances a judge's ability
to subvert a verdict despite being outvoted in the tribunal.
A taxonomy of official rules and regulations governing lay fact finding
is important, but answers to questions of interest will also require careful
empirical investigation. Professor Kutnjak Ivkovik, for example, reviews a
body of literature, that suggests that when lay people sit on mixed tribunals they tend to have little influence on the tribunal's decisions. Surely,
however, there is some variance. In criminal cases, for example, it appears
that lay judges influence sentencing decisions to a greater degree than they
influence findings of guilt or innocence. We need to understand the variance in lay influence associated with different institutional arrangements
and whether differences in the latter drive the variance we identify. For
example, in some mixed court systems that follow an inquisitorial model,
lay judges have little or no opportunity to review the case dossier before
trial, while in other systems they have this opportunity. What effect does
this difference have? Are lay judges more active participants in the latter
tribunals than in the former? Do lay judges have more say over verdicts
when they have had a chance to review the case dossier before trial? Similar questions might be asked about the period for which lay judges serve,
which may range from a single case to cases heard during a term that lasts
a year or longer. Does lengthy service as a lay judge encourage arguing
with professional judges because of greater experience and a sense of competence? Does greater decision-making responsibility and experience
transform the lay judge into a yet more faithful clone of a tribunal's profes-
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sional judge or judges? Not only are answers to questions like these empirical, but answers may differ depending on national cultures or other
tribunal characteristics.
Those who seek to reform lay justice systems to enhance popular
involvement in justice need country-specific answers to these and other
questions, and not just because they are matters of academic interest. The
reality is that movements to increase popular participation by instituting
independent jury trial are likely to meet resistance and, as in Japan, may
result not in a lay jury system but in the "compromise" institution of the
mixed tribunal. As I have already indicated, considerable research suggests that this is hardly a compromise, for professional judges dominate
decision-making in mixed tribunals to the point that the benefits of lay factfinding may be largely, if not entirely, lost. This outcome may, however,
not be a necessary one. Some institutional arrangements can make lay
participation on mixed tribunals far more influential than other institutional arrangements. Consider as a thought experiment a rule that would
require lay judges on mixed tribunals to deliberate on their own until they
reach a tentative verdict, and only then involve the professional judge or
judges in the discussion. Such a system might stiffen the spines of a tribunal's lay members, and would preclude perception of a professional judge's
factual characterization as an "of course" truth. Identifying the implications of different institutional arrangements for lay influence can allow
researchers in countries reluctant to adopt American-style juries to still
make a case for meaningful popular involvement.
Research focused on enhancing the power of lay judges without moving to an independent American style jury might learn from the relationship between jury research and jury reform in the United States. Many
jury reforms began not in trial courts, but in psychology laboratories
where researchers systematically explored the implications of different jury
sizes, different decision rules, the presentation of written instructions, the
use of grammatically simplified instructions, the effects of different evidentiary rules, and other rules and procedures that might affect jury decision
making. While there is always some distance between a social science laboratory and the real world, proving the feasibility and potential desirability
of a reform in the laboratory can pave the way for experimental or quasiexperimental implementation in the real world and ultimately lead to systemic reform. While obvious problems exist with replicating the dynamics
of a mixed tribunal in the laboratory, approximations of such authority
relationships should be possible, and the implications of different arrangements for lay participation can be studied. A particularly propitious time
for such research is prior to the institution of a new decision-making system, as it will usually be easier to influence the design of a system not yet
implemented than to change entrenched procedures.
A second criterion for evaluating lay participation world-wide looks
beyond the micro-level parameters of jury power and participation, and
instead focuses on the institutional role of juries in governmental systems
and the deployment of state power. This perspective asks: to what extent
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do juries check state power and contribute to the ongoing viability of a
democratic government and its supporting institution? Professor
Thaman's description of the Russian jury system indicates that a jury system may appear democratic and independent in that jurors are chosen at
random, many people share jury duty, and jurors have a relatively free
hand in returning verdicts. However, the system may contribute relatively
little to institutional democracy because jurors can be barred from hearing
relevant evidence or their verdicts, if unwelcome, can be rejected by the trial
judge or easily overturned on appeal.
A third set of questions, admittedly difficult to investigate empirically,
concerns the relationship between systems of lay adjudication and legal
procedures. For example, although it has been said that the hearsay rule is
a creature of the jury system, continental systems are wary of hearsay even
if they do not exclude it. It is, in fact, not clear why some of the complex
rules of evidence associated with American-style jury systems exist. The
reason usually given is that juries cannot be trusted to properly evaluate
certain kinds of evidence. Another explanation, however, is that verdicts
that emanate, without justifying explanations, from black box decisionmakers like English or American juries make for difficulties in the exercise
of hierarchical appellate control. Elaborate rules of evidence are a way of
giving trial and appellate courts, and hence the state, greater control over
case outcomes. At trial, judges have considerable leeway to determine
what evidence juries can hear for what purposes, while on appeal, appellate courts that wish to reverse verdicts can almost always find an evidentiary error on which to pin a reversal. Although these rules may appear
binding on courts, most often they are not, for trial judges typically have
considerable discretion in making evidentiary rulings while appellate
judges, including Supreme Court Justices, are adept at ignoring or finding
harmless evidentiary errors when they wish to uphold a verdict. It is
hardly proof of the judicial control hypothesis, but it is interesting to note
that the Anglo-American evidentiary rules arose when other methods of
controlling jury verdicts, such as threatening jurors whose verdicts displeased courts with attaint, were becoming difficult to implement or were
banned.
Other procedural matters worth investigating in cross-national perspective include the degree of adversary in legal procedure in relation to
tribunal type, including the role of counsel, discovery and institutions for
the adversarial production of information, and methods for handling
expert evidence. Sorting out issues of causality and the relationship
between procedure and the degree of lay involvement in decision-making
will be exceedingly difficult, for the empirical association of certain procedures with juries, on the one hand, or mixed courts or professional
benches, on the other, may not necessarily reflect any relationships or even
particularly functional ones. Procedures may have developed alongside
modes of decision-making without being entailed by them, and the consistency of associations may simply reflect the fact that countries tended to
borrow rules of case processing from each other as complete packages. A

Cornell International Law Journal

Vol. 40

good example is the participation of the parties in the development of evidence. Although this once seemed to be a defining characteristic of the
Anglo-American trial system, some continental countries have moved substantially in this direction without changing the composition of
tribunals. 12
The resurgence of jury trials may be of particular value in sorting out
relationships between rules of trial procedure and tribunal characteristics.
Examining the evidential and procedural accoutrements of newly institutionalized Anglo-American style juries can provide insight into what is
functional and what is simply cultural coincidence. Investigations into
how different systems deal with the special challenges of modern evidence,
such as the challenges posed by complex contested expert evidence, will
also be informative. We do not know today how the relative roles lay and
professional adjudicators play in deciding cases affect the ways of meeting
this challenge.
A final topic for comparative analysis is assessing the cultural role of
adjudicatory systems in different societies. In the United States and
England, for example, some jury verdicts have achieved iconic status.
Bushell's Case13 and the trial of John Peter Zenger 14 have come to stand for
popular resistance to government tyranny and the high value Anglo-American culture places on free speech and a free press. Verdicts in other cases,
such as the OJ. Simpson trial or the acquittal of police accused of beating
Rodney King, have come to symbolize the country's racial divisions and
their intractability. Interest groups have also tried to make icons of verdicts
to advance their own political or financial agendas. The punitive damage
award in the McDonald's coffee spill case has been marketed 15 as an example of popular biases against big business, a reason why juries cannot be
trusted to award punitive damages and a means to bemoan an alleged rise
of a culture of victimization and the erosion of personal responsibility.
Then there are films like Twelve Angry Men that present a different image of
the citizen juror. These films make principled heroes of the ordinary guyif Henry Fonda can be thought ordinary-who serves on a jury.
Do trial verdicts have a similar status in other countries or are they
less likely to serve as such cultural icons because they do not symbolize the
biases of lay fact-finders or the rebellion of citizens against authority? If
they do serve as cultural icons, do they serve only as testimony to state
power and corruption, such as in the Stalinist purges of the 1930s? How is
the role of the investigating magistrate treated in the myths and fictions of
other nations? This position seems to allow for heroic action against the
See, e.g., Mirjan R. Damaska, Models of Criminal Procedure, 51 ZBORNIK (ColPapers of Zagreb Law School) (2001).
124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670).
See, e.g., LIVINGSTON RUTHERFURD, JOHN PETER ZENGER: His PRESS, His TRIAL, AND A
BIBLIOGRAPHy OF SENGER IMPRINTS (1906).
15. 1 intentionally use the word "marketing," as the facts of the McDonald's coffee
spill case paint a picture far different from the case's popular image. See Andrea Gerlin,
A Matter of Degree: How a Jury Decided That a Coffee Spill Is Worth $2.9 Million, WALL ST.
J., Sep. 1, 1994, at Al.
12.
lected
13.
14.
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odds. It enjoys no exact counterpart in the United States, though crusading
prosecutors and incorruptible police officers may share some of the same
aura. What kind of image do investigating magistrates have, and does the
judge's role in deciding cases, rather than investigating them, play any
part? Comparative research into the cultural symbolism of trial procedures
and their key actors could prove fascinating, as might research into
whether and how these symbols change with transformations in legal procedure and the role of lay decision-makers.
Conclusion
It is an exciting time to be a jury researcher. In the United States, new
data sets have allowed sophisticated quantitative research into jury verdict
patterns, generating new insights and confirming old ones about how
judges and juries decide particular cases. 16 Other research has led to and
tested the results of jury reforms, such as preinstructing juries, allowing
17
jurors to take notes, and permitting or even encouraging juror questions.
Also for the first time since Kalven and Zeisel's aborted attempt to record
jury deliberations in the 1950s, jury researchers have been able to observe
and code the deliberations of enough actual juries for scholars to assess the
strengths and shortcomings of mock jury research while generating important insights into how actual juries behave. 18
The cross-national study of juries and other institutions that provide
for lay input into legal decisions is a research frontier. The United States
and its researchers have in the past taken a rather imperialistic view of
juries and jury research. Juries have been regarded as a quintessentially
American institution. England, having abrogated the right to jury trials in
most cases, is thought to have largely forfeited its birthright claim to a special relationship to the jury and the existence of jury trials in many of the
former English colonies has received almost no attention from American
scholars. Jury trials in countries lacking an English heritage, such as the
trial of homicide cases in Brazil, have until recently almost entirely escaped
notice as examples of the genre.
Jury research has similarly been an almost entirely American enterprise. Following promising early work, English law was changed to preclude the kinds of research with actual juries that American scholars do.
Except for comparative lawyers, most of whom are without an empirical
bent, and a few scholars who thought the example of Germany and other
16. A leader in this area has been Theodore Eisenberg. See e.g., Theodore Eisenberg
et al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: An Empirical Study, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 743
(2002); Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Trial Outcomes and Demographics: Is
There A Bronx Effect?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1839 (2002); Theodore Eisenberg et al., Judge-Jury
Agreement in Criminal Cases: A PartialReplication of Kalven and Zeisel's The American
Jury, 2 J. EMPIRIcAL LEGAL STUD. 171 (2005).
17. See, e.g., Valerie P. Hans, U.S. Jury Reform: The Active Jury and the Adversarial
Ideal, 21 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 85 (2002).
18. See, e.g., Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Inside the Jury Room: Evaluating Juror
Discussions During Trial, 87 JUDICATURE 54 (2003).
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continental countries suggested ways to rationalize and improve American
judicial processes, attention to the methods and implications of non-jury
lay participation in legal decision-making has received little attention from
within the United States.' 9
This situation has changed. An international conference on lay participation in judicial decision-making, with an emphasis on juries and jurylike systems, was organized by Stephen Thaman and held in Sicily almost
eight years ago. It opened the eyes of many of the United States's jury
researchers to the fact that the institution they were studying was not
unique, but was rather one variation on the theme of lay legal decisionmaking.20 Efforts by Japanese lawyers and academics to institute jury systems, and the development of juries in countries like Russia and Spain, had
a similar effect on the horizons of American jury researchers, while recruiting researchers to this topic from countries around the world. Today there
is an active coterie of scholars researching juries, jury-like institutions, and
other systems of lay and professional adjudication. They gather regularly
and share papers at Law and Society Association meetings and international conferences. Their comparative scholarship on juries and other systems of lay adjudication is becoming widely published. 2 1 American
scholarship no longer provides the only lens with which to view jury
research, and American scholarship is better for it. Other systems of lay
adjudication are now more than a distant mirror. Rather, they allow a
comparative perspective that can shed new light on the socio-political role
of legal decision-making in countries throughout the world. The Cornell
Citizen Participation in East Asian Legal Systems Conference, at which the
papers in this issue were presented, is testimony to the interest in and
implications of comparative research on lay participation in legal decisionmaking and what we might learn from it. We are, however, still at an early
stage in empirically answering numbers of fascinating questions.

19. The writings of Mirjan Damaska are a notable exception. See, e.g., MiRJAN R.
A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE
LEGAL PROCESS (1986).
20. See generally ST. LOuIS-WARsAw TRANSATLANTIC LJ. (2001-2002).
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21. See, e.g.,

WORLD JURY SYSTEMS

(Neil Vidmar ed., 2000).

